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I. INTRODUCTION 
A remarkable consequence of medical science which enables 
us to cryopreserve1
 
       †   Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. is Professor of Law, teaching family law at 
Suffolk University Law School.  He is the co-author, with Maureen McBrien, of 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (2006).  He served as Chair of the A.B.A. 
Family Law Section Committee on Assisted Reproduction and Genetics from 2004 
to 2007 while the Committee was drafting the A.B.A. Model Act Governing 
Assisted Reproductive Technology.  The author thanks research assistants Heather 
Warnken and Cara Thompson. 
 1. Cryopreservation is a process for preserving gametes or embryos in which 
the cells are dehydrated, suspended in an aqueous medium, treated with a 
cyopreservant and transferred to liquid nitrogen, cooled off to minus 196 degrees, 
and stored in this frozen condition for possible future use.  See Michael S. Simon, 
“Honey, I Froze the Kids”: Davis v. Davis and the Legal Status of Early Embryos, 23 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J.  131, 131 n.7 (1991).  This is sometimes referred to as the “freezing” of 
gametes.  Id.  The A.B.A. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology 
section 102(31) uses the term “preservation” rather than cryopreservation to 
account for the possibility that future research may produce other methods of 
preserving embryos and gametes.  A.B.A. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. 
TECH. § 102(31) (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/ 
artmodelact.pdf [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. 
 human gametes is the ability to conceive 
1
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children long after the parent’s death.2  This ability may be a 
remarkable achievement of reproductive medical science, but it 
also created legal problems that prior generations did not consider.  
Human intrauterine insemination3 has been used for assisted 
human reproduction in the United States since the mid-nineteenth 
century.4  The potential for posthumous reproduction was not 
realized, however, until science achieved the ability to cryopreserve 
gametes and embryos for long periods of time.5  When the 
potential for preserving sperm for many years after the father’s 
death was recognized fifty years ago, the possibility of rethinking 
traditional concepts of parenthood and inheritance quickly 
followed and gave birth to the concept of the “fertile decedent” 
that is now familiar to students of future interests.6
II. DEFINITIONS OF POSTHUMOUS CHILDREN 
 
For purposes of this article, a posthumous child is one who is 
conceived after the death of its parent.  This definition does not 
include a pretermitted child who was born or adopted after the 
execution of a will.7  Neither will it deal with a child who is 
conceived by coitus during the lifetime of its father but not born 
until after his death.8
 
 2. Although it is possible to preserve sperm and embryos for long periods of 
time, the cryopreservation of unfertilized eggs for long periods has been less 
successful.  Debra A. Gook & David H. Edgar, Human Oocyte Cryopreservation, 13 
HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 591, 591–605 (2007) (noting that the science of egg 
preservation shows no proper evidence of improved clinical outcome). 
 3. Intrauterine insemination is also sometimes called “artificial 
insemination.” 
 4. Johnson v. Super. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 881 (2002) (referencing the 
fact that the first reported use of intrauterine insemination in the United States 
was in 1866). 
 5. For example, cryopreserved embryos may be preserved in a viable 
condition for up to half a century.  R. G. Edwards & Helen K. Beard, Destruction of 
Cryopreserved Embryos: UK Law Dictated the Destruction of 3000 Cryopreserved Human 
Embryos, 12 HUM. REPROD. 3 (1997). 
 6. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the 
Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942 (1962). 
 7. The Uniform Probate Code, section 2-108 provides that a child “in 
gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives 
120 hours or more after birth.”  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (revised 1990), 8 
U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 2008). Thus, a child in gestation who so qualifies is the legal heir 
of its parent even if that parent is dead when the child is born.  See also 26B C.J.S. 
Descent and Distribution § 51 (2008) (noting that a posthumous child is not 
necessarily a pretermitted child). 
  A situation in which a father sexually 
 8. By definition, a child conceived by sexual intercourse is not a child of 
2
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impregnates a woman during his lifetime and the child is not born 
until after his death does not raise the same kinds of legal issues as 
the use of gametes to conceive a child after a parent’s death.9
Although there is a clear difference between the status of a 
child conceived after a parent’s death and one conceived by the 
use of the gametes of an incompetent parent who is not able to give 
consent, the law treats the two situations the same.  Therefore, the 
American Bar Association Model Act on Assisted Reproduction
  This 
article will focus on the legal implications of the use of gametes and 
embryos to conceive human children after the death of the 
producer(s) of cryopreserved sperm, eggs or embryos. 
10  
requires that, except in an emergency,11 gametes or embryos 
should not be collected from either a deceased or an incompetent 
person unless they gave consent in a record12 before death or 
incompetency, or expressly authorized a fiduciary to give such 
consent.13
 
assisted reproduction.  MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 102-1. 
 9. The kinds of issues presented in a case involving a child allegedly 
conceived by sexual intercourse before his father’s death revolve around 
traditional paternity litigation, such as whether the decedent is the child’s 
biological father. The general rule is that a child born after a parent’s death is not 
an heir under the law of inheritance unless the child was conceived naturally, i.e. 
by sexual intercourse.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 2.1 cmt. d (1999). 
 10. The American Bar Association Family Law Section approved the A.B.A. 
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology in 2007, and the A.B.A. 
House of Delegates approved it on February 11, 2008.  See Charles P. Kindregan, 
Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New American Bar Association 
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 203 (2008) 
(discussing the history of the Act, its approval by the American Bar Association, 
and the provisions of the Act). 
 11. The A.B.A. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 
section 205(2) defines an exception in the collection of gametes or embryos as 
circumstances in which, in the treating physician’s opinion, delay would cause a 
loss of viability, and there is a genuine question as to the existence of a recorded 
consent by the now incompetent or deceased person.  MODEL ACT, supra note 1, 
§ 205(2). 
 12. The A.B.A. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 
section 102(33) defines a record as “information inscribed in a tangible medium 
or stored in an electronic or other medium that is retrievable in perceivable 
form.”  MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 102(33). 
 13. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 205(1). 
  For that reason, any comments in this article about 
consent of a deceased parent to use of his or her gametes should 
also apply to an incompetent person. 
3
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III. WHY IS POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION USED? 
There are various circumstances in which people seek to 
procreate a child using the gametes of a deceased person.  In some 
instances, a surviving spouse or intimate friend seeks to use the 
gametes which have been specifically cryopreserved for use prior to 
the death of the loved one.14  Examples include situations in which 
a soldier or other person engaged in high risk activity 
cryopreserved his or her gametes.15  Another example is when a 
dying or seriously ill person cryopreserves gametes for use by 
specifically named potential survivors.16  In other instances, an 
untimely death may create a situation in which gametes become 
available even though the deceased person did not anticipate death 
and therefore did not specifically consent before death.17  These 
are the most legally troublesome cases.18  For example, a parent or 
spouse may seek access to the sperm of a person killed in an 
automobile accident or in a war, wishing to continue the genetic 
line of the family.19
 
 14. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 840–41 (1993) (man executed a 
will giving his cryopreserved sperm to his girlfriend before committing suicide). 
 15. Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46 
ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2004) (citing various newspaper reports of United States 
soldiers cryopreserving their sperm before deployment); Major Maria Doucettperry, A 
Look at Posthumous Reproduction as it Relates to Today’s Military, Dept. of the Army, 
Pamphlet 27-50-420 (reviewing policies of the United States Army involving the 
collection of gametes and their use in producing posthumous reproduction). 
 16. Elizabeth Gorman, Minnesota Woman Trying to Conceive Her Husband’s 
Child—After His Death, MINNPOST.COM, June 24, 2008, http://www.minnpost.com/ 
stories/2008/06/24/2340/minnesota_woman_trying_to_conceive_her_husbands_
child_--_after_his_death (noting that husband cryopreserved his sperm for his 
wife’s use before starting cancer treatment which was likely to make him infertile).  
See also Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002) 
(husband placed his sperm in sperm bank before his death for his wife’s use). 
 17. Ike Flores, Newlywed Dies in Crash, But Hopes For Children Live in Extracted 
Sperm, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1994, at A10 (recounting removal of sperm from body of 
man killed in an accident); Peter Gregory, Court Lets Widow Save Husband’s Sperm, 
THE SIDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 22, 1998, at 3 (recounting that a widow whose 
husband died in an motor vehicle accident obtained court judgment to have her 
husband’s sperm removed from his body). 
 18. See Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is It Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 39 (1999) (questioning use of gametes removed from body of 
deceased person). 
 19. Aron Heller, Family Gets OK to Use Dead Man’s Sperm, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON., Jan. 29, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/ 
01/29/international/i054346S45.DTL&feed=rss.news (family of soldier killed by a 
sniper obtained an Israeli court order to use sperm removed immediately after his 
death to have a child to be carried by a gestational surrogate). 
  In another example, a husband may seek to use 
4
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the eggs of his now incompetent wife in order to use a gestational 
surrogate to gestate them.  In other instances, a person may seek 
access to the gametes of a family member which the deceased 
person had cryopreserved for his own future use. 
IV. PROPOSALS REGARDING POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION 
For the most part, issues relating to posthumous reproduction 
have focused on inheritance issues,20  Social Security issues,21 or 
other benefits.22  The drafts of the various uniform and model acts, 
however, reflect the wider importance of the topic even beyond 
eligibility for benefits, and they continue to try to develop law on 
the subject notwithstanding the failure of the first proposed 
uniform law on the subject.23  The newest version of the Uniform 
Parentage Act (2000), amended in 2002, includes a provision titled 
“Parental Status of Deceased Individual.”24
[I]f an individual who consented in a record to be a 
parent by assisted reproduction dies before placement of 
eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a 
parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse
  This provides: 
25
 
 20. See Robert M. Harper, Dead Hand Problem: Why New York’s Estates, Powers 
and Trusts Law Should be Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived Children as 
Decedent’s Issue and Descendents, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 267 (2008) (discussing 
problems of inheritance in determining the status of posthumously conceived 
children); Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem 
Conception, Parental Responsibility and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967 (1996) 
(discussing inheritance problems from posthumous conception of children). 
 21. Compare Woodward, 760 N.E.2d 257 (children posthumously conceived 
using dead father’s sperm were entitled to Social Security benefits), with Khabbaz 
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1108 (N.H. 2007) (posthumously conceived child 
not entitled to Social Security benefits). 
 22. See, e.g., Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., No. CA 08-222, 2008 WL 4724076 (Ark. 
App. Oct. 28, 2008) (posthumously conceived children entitled to workman’s 
compensation benefits). 
 23. The first attempt to draft a uniform law governing assisted reproduction 
was the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act.  UNIF. STATUS OF 
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988).  Section 4(b) of the Act provided 
that a child conceived using eggs or sperm of a deceased person is not a parent of 
the resulting child.  Id. § 4(b).  The Act was not widely adopted and was replaced 
by the provisions in Articles 7 and 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act.  UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT (2000) §§ 701–809 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 51 (Supp. 2008). 
 24. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 55 (Supp. 
2008). 
 
 25. The term “deceased spouse” in the official text of section 707 appears 
inconsistent with the term “individual” in the remainder of the statute.  Compare 
id., with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 51 (Supp. 2008).  
Prior to the 2002 amendments, the consent provision of section 707 governing 
5
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consented in a record that if the assisted reproduction 
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would 
be a parent of the child.26
This proposed rule would clearly require express consent in 
some sort of record given during the lifetime of the person whose 
gametes or embryos are to be used after his or her death to 
conceive a child.  If such consent does not exist prior to the 
placement of the gametes or embryos and the death of the person, 
the law would not attribute parentage of the resulting child to the 
deceased person.
 
27  The consent requirement, however, does not 
apply to a gamete donor or embryo donors because that person or 
those persons did not intend to be a parent either during his or her 
lifetime or after death.28
[E]xcept as otherwise provided in the enacting 
jurisdiction’s probate code, if an individual who 
consented in a record to be a parent by assisted 
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm or 
embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the 
resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a 
 
The American Bar Association Model Act on Assisted 
Reproduction in part tracks the Uniform Parentage Act consent 
provisions as applied to post-mortem conception, but with several 
differences.  It provides: 
 
consent by a person to post-mortem use of his or her gametes limited consent to a 
“spouse,” but the 2002 amendments replaced “spouse” with “individual” except as 
noted in the quotation in the text.  Id.  In enacting the uniform act, Texas and 
Utah replaced the word “individual” with the term “spouse” throughout their 
version of section 707, making clear that in those states, only a married person’s 
consent has the effect of approving consent.  TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160 (2001); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (2008).  Some states enacted section 707 by 
eliminating the word “spouse” entirely, making clear that the provision deals with 
individual consent whether the person is married or not.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 13, § 8-707 (2008). 
 26. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 55 (Supp. 
2008).   See generally Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. &  Maureen McBrien, Posthumous 
Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 579 (2005). 
 27. In the case of the placement of an embryo produced by both now-
deceased persons, it seems obvious that the consent of both of them during their 
lifetimes would be required.  Such mutual consent would also be required in an 
inter vivos embryo transfer.  See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, 
Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved 
Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169 (2004). 
 28. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 704 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 53 (Supp. 
2008) (consent requirement does not apply to a donor).  A donor is an individual 
who produces eggs or sperm for assisted reproduction, as distinguished from an 
intended parent.  Id. § 102(8). 
6
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record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after 
death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the 
child.29
The Model Act by its own terms is intended to defer to any 
probate code provision which a state may enact dealing with 
posthumous reproduction, while the uniform law contains no such 
provision.
 
30  During the drafting of the Model Act, concerns were 
expressed about the potential impact on estate planning and 
administration of estates when there are cryopreserved gametes 
and embryos which at the time of death are still not placed.31  
While the Uniform Probate Code does not currently expressly 
provide for children of posthumous reproduction,32 it is possible 
that future legislation in some states may do so.  The A.B.A. Model 
Act provides for this potential development.33
It will be noted that both the Uniform Parentage Act and the 
A.B.A. Model Act on Assisted Reproduction refer to the consent of 
a deceased spouse,
 
34
 
 29. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 607.  An example of a court honoring the 
intent of a deceased gamete provider is found in In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 311 (Cal. App. 2008) in which a widow sought a court order giving her 
access to her late husband’s cryopreserved sperm, which had been deposited as 
part of the couple’s in vitro fertilization treatment.  The parents of the deceased 
man appeared and objected to release of the sperm.  Id. at 312.  Before his death 
in an accident, the man expressed a desire not to have children, but agreed to 
participate in the fertility treatment to please his wife and to avoid a divorce.  Id. at 
313.  As part of the medical treatment, he executed a form that included an 
option to dispose of his deposited sperm in the event of his death.  Id.  This box 
was checked on the form.  Id.  The court ruled that his expression of intent 
controlled, and that this did not implicate the widow’s procreative autonomy since 
only his gametes and not hers were affected by the choice to discard the sperm.  
Id. at 317–18. 
 30. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 607. 
 31. This information is personal knowledge of the author, obtained while he 
served as Chair of the A.B.A. Family Law Section Committee on Reproductive and 
Genetic Technologies Committee during the drafting of the Model Act Governing 
Assisted Reproductive Technology.  To deal with this problem a provision was 
added to section 607 (which deals with the parental status of a deceased 
individual) which defers to any contrary provision in a state’s probate code. 
 32. The current version of the Uniform Probate Code does not provide either 
for or against inheritance by a posthumous child and simply provides that for 
purposes of intestate inheritance, an individual is the child of its natural parents 
regardless of their marital status.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (revised 1990), 8 
U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 2008). 
 33. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 701–02. 
 34. UNIF.. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 55 
(Supp. 2008); MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 501-3-4. 
  but the Model Act contains a very broad 
definition of legal spouse.  According to the Model Act, legal 
7
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spouse means “an individual married to another, or who has a legal 
relationship to another that this state accords rights and 
responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent to, those of 
marriage.”35  Both the Uniform Parentage Act and the A.B.A. 
Model Act provisions relating to posthumous reproduction are 
premised on the existence of a spousal relationship, however 
“spouse” may be defined under state law.36  They would not, 
therefore, be applicable to the factual situation that existed in the 
famous California decision in Hecht v. Superior Court, in which a 
deceased man provided in his will for his surviving girlfriend to 
have and be able to use his cryopreserved sperm.37
The A.B.A. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproduction also 
restricts the collection of gametes, embryos or preserved tissue 
from a deceased person unless that person executed consent in a 
record prior to death, or unless that person’s authorized fiduciary 
has express authorization from the deceased person to give such 
consent.
 
38  This does not, however, solve the problem when, for 
example, an emergency room physician is asked to remove sperm 
or eggs from a recently deceased person and the failure to do so 
promptly would result in loss of viability.  For this reason, the 
A.B.A. Model Act contains a provision expressly allowing the 
prompt removal of the gametes when it is alleged that the deceased 
person did consent in a record but the record is not then 
immediately available.39
 
 35. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 102-21.  The Uniform Parentage Act does not 
define spouse or legal spouse, and it is potentially subject to interpretation as 
being restricted to traditional male-female formal marriage.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
(2000) § 102 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 8 (Supp. 2008). 
 36. Section 707 of the Uniform Parentage Act and section 606 of the Model 
Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology both require a recorded consent 
to posthumous reproduction by the “deceased spouse.”  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
(2000), § 707 (amended 2002); MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 707.  The Uniform 
Parentage Act does not define spouse, but § 102-21 defines a legal spouse as “an 
individual married to another, or who has a legal relationship to another that this 
state accords rights and responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent to, 
those of marriage.”   UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000), § 102-21 (amended 2002).  This 
definition would treat partners in a legal civil union or registered domestic 
partnership as being “spouses.” 
 37. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 860–61 (1993) (ruling that the 
use of cryopreserved sperm of a deceased man to produce a child would not be 
contrary to public policy). 
 38. MODEL ACT, supra note 1, § 205-1. 
 39. Id. § 205-2. 
  Gametes removed in this emergency 
situation, however, may not be transferred unless subsequently 
8
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approved by a court, and the absence of a record consent creates a 
presumption that no consent was given.40
V. STATE LAWS GOVERNING THE STATUS OF POSTHUMOUSLY 
CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
 
The status of a child that is posthumously conceived is 
important for the resolution of various legal issues.  The most 
important of these is the question of inheritance rights of the child 
under the state’s intestacy laws.  This in turn becomes important in 
the resolution of Social Security rights,41 discussed below, since 
federal law defers to state law in the determination of the status of 
the child.  The question may also be important in determining the 
child support obligations of the estate of the deceased parent, at 
least in states in which the estate may have an obligation to pay 
child support.42
Most states have no statutes dealing expressly with posthumous 
reproduction.  A few states have enacted the Uniform Parentage 
Act, which contains some version of Section 707 dealing with 
children of posthumous reproduction.
 
43  In some of these states—
Texas,44  Utah,45 and Washington46
 
 40. Id. § 205-3.  Failure to comply with the rules governing post-mortem 
removal of gametes or embryos can result in civil or criminal liability, as provided 
in law.  Id. § 205-4. 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2000); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (1989) 
(standard for determining rights of child of Social Security beneficiary). 
 42. See, e.g., L.M. v. R.L.R., 888 N.E.2d 934, 937 (Mass. 2008) (initial order of 
support for nonmarital child may be entered and made enforceable against his 
estate after parent’s death). 
 43. As of the date this article was written Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act.  
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002).  A number of states have retained 
the older Uniform Parentage Act (1973) rather than enacting the newer version 
which was drafted years before the modern use of assisted reproduction except for 
intrauterine insemination; the 1973 version is not discussed in this article since the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has replaced it 
with the 2000 version as amended in 2002.  Id. Oklahoma elected to omit section 
707 in its enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act.  OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10,        
§ 7700 (West Supp. 2008). 
 44. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008). 
 45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (Supp. 2008). 
 46. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West 2008) 
—the legislation deletes the 
word “individual” at the beginning of section 707 and substitutes 
the word “spouse,” making clear that those states did not wish to 
legalize consent to posthumous reproduction by unmarried 
9
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persons.  The Texas statute also provides that the record 
containing the consent of the deceased person must be maintained 
by a licensed physician.47  Delaware48 and Wyoming49 have enacted 
versions of section 707 of  the Uniform Parentage Act which 
eliminate the word “spouse” and simply refer to “individuals” as 
consenting to posthumous reproduction.  Before it enacted the 
2000 Uniform Parentage Act in 2005,50 North Dakota was the only 
state which by statute expressly denied the parenthood of any 
person whose gametes were used after his or her death, but this law 
has been repealed.51
Some states have enacted statutes governing assisted 
reproduction that specifically provide for posthumously conceived 
children.  Colorado
  No state by statute now expressly prohibits 
any recognition of posthumous reproduction for all purposes. 
52 enacted a statute governing assisted 
reproduction which recognizes the status of a child whose gametes 
were produced from a now-deceased spouse.  Florida restricts 
claims for inheritance by a posthumously conceived child unless 
the deceased parent has provided for the child by will.53  Virginia54 
has enacted several statutes, but they are not entirely consistent.55
A. The California Statute 
 
The California courts were the first to struggle with the issues 
created by the possibility of posthumous conception.  In 1993 the 
Second District California Court of Appeal was asked to decide if 
an unmarried woman who had been designated by will to have 
access to and right to use the sperm of her now–deceased boyfriend 
 
 47. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008). 
 48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (Supp. 2006). 
 49. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2007). 
 50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (Supp. 2007) (applying section 707 to child 
of deceased spouse). 
 51. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-06 to -07, repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 135, § 11. 
 52. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(8) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007). 
 53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); see also Stephen v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (posthumously 
conceived child is not the legal heir of father under Florida law in absence of will 
so providing). 
 54. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-158B, -164(i) (2008). 
 55. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 232–
33 (2006) (noting problems and inconsistencies in application of the Virginia 
statutes). 
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should be allowed to receive his cryopreserved sperm.56  The court 
had been asked by the children of the deceased man to rule that 
state public policy should not approve of posthumous reproduction 
since it would permit the creation of an orphaned child by artificial 
means.57  A lower court had ordered the sperm destroyed, but on 
appeal the court reversed.58  In a decision of first impression under 
American law the court ruled that, in the absence of a statute 
governing the matter, a court did not have the authority to order 
the cryopreserved sperm destroyed and that no overriding public 
policy would prevent the gametes from being used to create a child 
after the father’s death when he specifically consented to it during 
his lifetime.59
A decade later, California enacted a statute in 2004 dealing 
with the consequences of posthumous reproduction.
 
60  This is the 
most comprehensive attempt to regulate posthumous reproduction 
by statute to date.  The statute deemed a posthumously conceived 
child to have been born during the lifetime of the parent when the 
requirements of the statute have been met.61  The statute provides 
for distribution of a parent’s property to the posthumously 
conceived child if the parent had consented to the postmortem use 
of his gametes in writing and designated a specified person to have 
their use.62  It is also required that the posthumous child be 
conceived and exist in utero within two years of the parent’s death.63
 
 56. Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). 
 57. Id. at 288. 
 58. Id. at 291. 
 59. Id. at 288–89. 
 60. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 775, p. 92 (A.B. 1910) (West) (amending 
various provisions in the California Codes, including the Family Code, the Health 
and Safety Code, the Insurance Code and the Probate Code).  The statute does 
not apply to posthumous children conceived by cloning.  Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
  
This statute recognizes the real potential for posthumous 
reproduction, and solves several problems.  These problems 
include the need for specific consent requirements, the need for a 
relative proximity of conception to the time of the parent’s death, 
and the need for the estate administrator to close the estate and 
make distribution in a reasonable time after the parent’s death. 
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B. Interpreting the Law in States That Have No Explicit Posthumous 
Conception Statutes 
When a state has not enacted a statute which expressly deals 
with the legal status of a posthumously conceived child, the courts 
will have to provide a legal interpretation based on its reading of 
the generalized statutes and common law in the jurisdiction.  The 
most common context in which this question has arisen to date 
involve Social Security claims.  The claims of a posthumously 
conceived child for Social Security benefits are based on the child’s 
relationship to the deceased Social Security beneficiary.64  This is 
dependent on the child’s status under state law; thus there have not 
been consistent results in various Social Security cases around the 
country.65
Under federal law, a child is entitled to benefits if he is the 
legally recognized child of a person who dies fully insured under 
the Social Security law, is under the age of 18, and was dependent 
on the Social Security beneficiary at the time of that person’s 
death.
 
66  In one case, a man who was dying of cancer cryopreserved 
his sperm with the intent of his wife having a child after his death, 
and the wife was successfully impregnated with his sperm sixteen 
months after his death.67  Twins were born more than two years 
after his death, and application was made for Social Security 
benefits for them.68  The administrator of the Social Security 
agency declined to award benefits, and counsel for the children 
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts.69  On appeal, 
the U.S. District Court judge sent certified questions to the 
Supreme Judicial Court of the state regarding the status of the 
twins under state law.70
 
 64. Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1987) (minor claiming 
Social Security benefits based on status of deceased parent must have been 
dependent on that parent). 
 65. Compare Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(granting Social Society benefits), and Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 
N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002) (granting Social Society benefits), with Finley v. Astrue, 
No. 07-627, 2008 WL 95775 (Ark. Jan. 10, 2008) (denying Social Security benefits) 
and Khabbaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1108 (N.H. 2007) (denying Social 
Security benefits). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2008). 
 67. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 260–61. 
 70. Id. at 261. 
  The Massachusetts intestacy statute did not 
contain a provision requiring that a posthumous child actually be 
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in utero at the time of a parent’s death in order to qualify as an 
heir.71
The Massachusetts court responded to the certified questions 
by stating that under state law it would be possible for the twins to 
be legal heirs of the deceased father.
 
72  The state court noted that 
in such a case, the children would have to be the genetic children 
of the deceased person and the deceased parent would have to 
have consented to use of his gametes for posthumous reproduction 
and to the support of a resulting child.73  The court also expressed 
the need to balance the state’s interest in the orderly and prompt 
administration of estates with the rights of the children.74  This 
suggests that in a future case in which a child is conceived long 
after the parent’s death, the result could be different.75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
interpreting Arizona law, also ruled that twins conceived with their 
genetic father’s sperm ten months after his death were entitled to 
Social Security benefits.
 
76  The Social Security administration 
argued that since the children did not exist when the father died, 
they were not then dependent on him for support.77  The court 
reasoned, however, that since the children were his legitimate 
children under state law, they were dependent on him.78
In a case involving an embryo that was implanted in a widow 
after the death of her husband, the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
ruled that the resulting child was not the legal heir of its biological 
father.
 
79  The court’s decision was based on the fact that the 
statute80
 
 71. Id. at 264. 
 72. Id. at 271–72.  See also L.M. v. R.L.R., 888 N.E.2d 934 (Mass. 2008) (noting 
that in Massachusetts, an estate can sometimes be held liable for child support). 
 73. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272. 
 74. Id. at 266–68. 
 75. Since death of a spouse terminates the marriage, technically a 
posthumously conceived child is born out of wedlock; in Woodward, the court 
noted that this did not affect the children’s right to inherit since under state law 
marital and nonmarital children are entitled to be treated equally.  Id. at 266–67.  
However, such equal treatment with regard to the distribution of a parent’s estate 
is not possible as to a child conceived after estate distribution has been made.  Id. 
at 267–68. 
 76. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 77. Id. at 595. 
 78. Id. at 599. 
 79. Finley v. Astrue, No. 07-627, 2008 WL 95775, at *1 (Ark. Jan. 10, 2008). 
 80. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (2004). 
 provides for inheritance for a posthumously born child 
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only if it was conceived before the parent’s death.81  Since the 
embryo was implanted after the father’s death the court ruled that 
the child could not inherit.82  The Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire, interpreting a statute relating to “surviving issue,” 
ruled that the posthumously conceived child must be surviving at 
the time of the father’s death in order to qualify as his heir.83  A 
federal court interpreted a Florida statute as providing that a 
posthumously conceived child is the issue of its deceased parent 
only if he provided for the child in his will.84
Based on court rulings to date it is apparent that at least for 
Social Security purposes state inheritance law must either expressly 
allow for posthumous conception of a child or contain language 
which is sufficiently vague to permit such an interpretation.
 
85  A 
requirement in a state statute that a child be a life in being at the 
time of a parent’s death would make it practically impossible to 
find that a child conceived after a parent’s death was a legal heir.86  
In addition the resulting child must be genetically connected to the 
deceased parent, which effectively rules out the use of donor sperm 
or eggs.  To the extent that legitimacy is a factor to be considered 
under state law the surviving parent and the deceased parent’s 
marriage becomes relevant.  Even independent of Social Security 
issues, the length of time which elapses between the death of the 
parent and the use of that person’s gametes to conceive a child 
becomes relevant, and in the future some reasonable time factor is 
likely to evolve.87
 
 81. Finley, 2008 WL 95775, at *4. 
 82. Id. at *1.  The court declined to define the meaning of the word 
conception.  Id. at *5. 
 83. Khabbaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1184 (N.H. 2007). 
 84. FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2008) (interpreted in Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc. 
Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2005)). 
 85. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004); Stephen, 
386 F. Supp. 2d at 1265; Finley, 2008 WL 95775, at *5; Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1184; 
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002). 
 86. A Social Security claim might prevail, however, based on some 
constitutional argument.  In Hart v. Charter, 94-3944 (E.D. La. 1996), dismissed, the 
court interpreted a Louisiana Statute as providing that a child not conceived 
naturally was not in being as of the death of a parent, but when a Social Security 
claimant who was conceived after the death of its parent raised constitutional 
arguments the Social Security Administration agreed to pay benefits. See Charles P. 
Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, supra note 55, at 240–41 (discussing the Hart 
litigation). 
 
 87. The Restatement (Third) of Property provides that for an afterborn child 
to inherit, the child would have to be born within a “reasonable time after the 
decedent’s death in order not to delay distribution of the estate unduly.”  
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Probate cases also provide some analysis on the issue of 
posthumously conceived children.  A New Jersey decision noted 
that the status of a posthumous child should be determined even if 
the father left no estate to be distributed in probate because it 
could be relevant if other persons left property to the “children” of 
the father in a will or if a child might be entitled to take from the 
estate of the father’s relatives who die intestate.88
Complications can arise when a settlor of a trust or other 
testamentary gift provides for “issue” or a similar designation and 
after that person’s death a child is conceived using assisted 
reproduction.
 
89  For example, a New York case involved a trust 
created in 1959 which provided for the income from the settlor’s 
trust to go to the issue of children but excluded adopted children.90  
The question presented to the court involved the status of twins 
conceived after the settlor’s death using his son-in-law’s sperm but a 
donor egg and a gestational surrogate.91  The court ruled that the 
child was a beneficiary of the trust since the settlor intended to 
exclude only adopted children, not all children who were not 
genetically related to him.92
In another case involving a trust created in 1969, the question 
presented was whether children conceived by in vitro fertilization 
using the sperm of the grantor’s son, who died a few years before 
the procedure, were “issue” or “descendants” of the grantor when 
the grantor intended members of his bloodline to be beneficiaries 
of his trust.
 
93  The court reasoned that as a matter of policy the law 
should consider one “born of this new biotechnology with the 
consent of their parents” as a natural child.94  Providing a 
“sympathetic reading” of the trust instruments, the New York court 
ruled that the twins were part of the grantor’s bloodline.95
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5, ¶ 8 
(1999). 
 88. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1259–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2000). 
 89. See, e.g., In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. Sur. 2005). 
 90. Id. at 879. 
 91. Id. at 879–80. 
 92. Id. at 878.  The husband and wife obtained a judgment of parentage from 
a California court, and the New York court noted that a child conceived by 
surrogacy in California is not governed by the adoption statute.  Id. at 881. 
 93. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (N.Y. Sur. 2007). 
 94. Id. at 211. 
 95. Id. at 211–12. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding that the reproductive technology has been 
available for over half of a century, the law governing posthumously 
conceived children is only starting to develop.  There is no 
uniformity in the governing law across the country, and from all 
appearances it is unlikely that universally accepted norms will 
evolve in the near future.  While, as discussed in this article, various 
statutory schemes have been proposed, no uniformity has been 
achieved.  This leaves the law in doubt, but it also leaves the legal 
status of parents and children in limbo and subject to different 
results in different states.  There is also no reason to treat non-
marital posthumous children differently from marital children 
conceived after death when the deceased parent has consented to 
their posthumous conception.  It is to be hoped that more 
consideration will be given to these issues and will result in more 
uniform legislative action in the future. 
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